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In this Article I argue that some norms are part of international law 
even if they have never been created by treaty or custom.  Because such
norms have never been posited, they are natural law norms, and my
thesis is that these natural law norms are as much part of international 
law as the posited norms.1  By this I mean that these norms should figure
in any catalog of what international law prescribes or permits.
Despite a venerable lineage that goes back to Aquinas, Grotius, Vitoria,
Puffendorf, and more modernly, the nineteenth-century Scottish scholar 
James Lorimer, the twentieth-century Austrian publicist Alfred Verdross,
* © 2013 Fernando R. Tesón. Tobias Simon Eminent Scholar, Florida State 
University College of Law.
1. I use the word norms to avoid prejudging whether the subjects at issue are
rules or principles in Ronald Dworkin’s sense.
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and I think, Ronald Dworkin, the view I defend here is unpopular these 
days.2  In fact, it is so unpopular that I feel compelled to say what I am 
not claiming.  First, I do not endorse any particular metaphysics that may
be associated with the classical natural law tradition.  I am aware that 
many readers are alarmed by the word natural. But in this Article, I do 
not mean anything that requires a complicated ontological or metaphysical 
background. Second, I express no views about the desirability of
enforcement of these natural law norms.  By natural law norm, I mean a
normative proposition that is binding on those to whom it is addressed
but has not itself been created by any actual social process such as
legislation, treaty, or custom.  My only point is jurisprudential: these 
nonenacted norms are part of international law, and they are legal
norms, not merely desirable moral norms.  Finally, I do not offer a list of 
those norms but examine only one of them—the prohibition of state-
conducted mass murder.  I argue that this prohibition has been part of
international law since the emergence of nation-states, even before the 
Genocide Convention, the Nuremberg trials, and other twentieth-century
developments.3 
If I can make a credible case for this particular norm, then I will have 
shown that natural law analysis is possible.  I do not inquire here whether 
my method yields other international norms. But I will be satisfied if I 
can persuade readers that the prohibition of state-conducted mass murder 
is a natural law norm, even if readers thought that this was the only
natural law norm.  And I agree with critics of natural law that most norms
are and should be conventional.  Certainly a function of positive
international law is to make norms concrete and determinate; without that 
determination, natural law norms, and any general positive norms, for 
that matter, may be hard to apply to concrete cases.  But this concession
does not undermine my central point that these norms are part and parcel
of international law.
I propose what I hope will be a plausible natural law approach, one 
that, I hope, is free from the traditional objection of arbitrariness that has 
been leveled against it.  My claim is that the very concept of international 
2. See, e.g., 1 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A 
TREATISE OF THE JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES (London, William
Blackwood & Sons 1883); ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES 
VÖLKERRECHT: THEORIE UND PRAXIS (3d ed. 1984). 
3. Other candidates for natural law international norms are the prohibition of official
torture, now supported by a wide consensus but not by practice, and the rest of the “Great
Crimes” of international criminal law, now codified, inter alia, in the Rome Statute of the
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law entails some elementary normative propositions.4  The prohibition of
state-conducted mass murder is one of such propositions. 
I. A CASE STUDY: RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
Starting in April 1915, the government of the Ottoman Empire killed 
about 1.5 million of its Armenian citizens in the Turkish province of
Eastern Anatolia.  They were mostly unarmed civilians—men, women, and 
children.  Many of them were murdered; the rest were marched to death
into the Syrian Desert. Many endured rape and beatings; few survived.
There is widespread agreement about these facts, which are amply
documented.5 
This horrifying historical incident gives rise to an important legal 
question: Does the current Turkish state bear international responsibility
for the 1915 massacres?
I distinguish this legal question from several related issues.  First, the 
legal question must be severed from the distracting politics of the
Armenian genocide, important as they may be, especially for the Armenian
community.  For a long time now, the Armenian community has insisted 
that Turkey acknowledge its responsibility, apologize, and pay reparations.6 
Governments have generally sided with the Armenians: twenty-one
countries, including Russia and France, as well as forty-three states of
the United States of America, have recognized the events as genocide.7 
However, the Turkish government has steadfastly refused.  According to 
Turkey, there was no will to exterminate the Armenian population and 
4. In a sense of “entailment” that I will soon clarify. 
5. See, e.g., TANER AKÇAM, A SHAMEFUL ACT: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND 
THE QUESTION OF TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY (Paul Bessemer trans., Metropolitan Books 
2006) (1999); RAYMOND KÉVORKIAN, THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: A COMPLETE HISTORY
(I.B. Tauris & Co. 2011) (2006). 
6. Armenian advocates maintain a website that updates developments related to 
the genocide. See  ARMENIAN NAT’L INST., http://www.armenian-genocide.org (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2014). 
7. The list is available online.  See Countries That Recognize the Armenian Genocide, 
ARMENIAN NAT’L INST., http://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014); International Affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, ARMENIAN 
NAT’L INST., http://www.armenian-genocide.org/current_category.11/affirmation_list.html









   
 
   
  














     
  
  
   
 
the deaths were unfortunate incidents of war.8  Additionally, the Turkish 
government, apparently supported by Turkish public opinion, sees this 
demarche as no less than a new effort of the West to humiliate Turkey
and Islam—as a new crusade. 
Second, I do not address whether the Ottoman Empire’s actions were 
technically genocide.  An inordinate amount of the debate has been devoted
to whether or not this emblematic word should be used to describe the 
events of 1915. Just recently, President Obama incurred the wrath of the 
Armenian community and human rights activists for refusing to use the
word, an omission attributed to the President’s reluctance to offend an
important Muslim ally.9  As indicated, Turkey’s official position is that
the events of 1915 did not constitute genocide because the government 
of Turkey did not have the specific intent to exterminate the Armenians, 
as required by the applicable rules.10 Armenian advocates hotly dispute 
this and point to documentary evidence that the killings were deliberately
planned with intent to eliminate the Armenians from the Ottoman Empire.11 
I find this debate rather sterile, notwithstanding its considerable political 
and symbolic significance.  Whether or not we call the 1915 events 
genocide is a purely verbal question because even if the murderers
lacked the specific intent to exterminate a sufficiently specified
group—an intention superimposed on the murderous intent—mass 
murders are equally egregious.  Whether we decide to call the events of 
1915 crime against humanity instead of genocide would not alter the
issue of substantive responsibility.  Nor is mass murder less serious as a 
crime than genocide. It is understandable that Armenian advocates would
fiercely attempt to convince the world that the massacres constituted
genocide. It is equally understandable that Turkey would reject with
equal intensity the application of a word so loaded with condemnation. 
But words lack magical power.  However we call these events, we want
to know if Turkey should be held responsible for them today.
8. Turkey argues both that the genocide never happened and that the word 
genocide is inapplicable.  See Turkish PM Scorns Armenia Apology, BBC NEWS (Dec.
17, 2008, 5:24 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7788486.stm.
9. See Matt Welch, Obama Again Breaks Promise To Call Armenian Genocide a 
‘Genocide,’ REASON.COM (Apr. 29, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/04/29/obama- 
again-breaks-promise-to-call-armen.
10. See Haig Khatchadourian, Compensation and Reparation as Forms of 
Compensatory Justice, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY 429, 442–43 (2006).  According to the 1948
Genocide Convention, “genocide means [a number of acts, including deliberate killing]
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such.”  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art.
2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
11. See Roger W. Smith et al., Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian 
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The third question I bypass is that of international criminal responsibility. 
All the perpetrators are dead, so no criminal prosecution is possible.
Instead, this is a case of international state responsibility, which, if 
established, would generate an obligation of reparation.  Of course, if a 
government official perpetrates an international crime that generates 
criminal individual responsibility, that act is a fortiori an international
wrong that generates state responsibility.  An interesting issue is what 
legal conclusion we should draw from the fact that this is not a criminal 
prosecution but a question of state responsibility.  It might be argued, for
example, that the worries we may have about retroactivity are not as 
strong in a case of state responsibility, which after all can be settled with 
compensation, as it is in the case of criminal prosecution, where the issue, 
as in the Nuremberg trials, was whether or not to punish the defendants. 
I do not, however, pursue this line of argument because I do not think 
that establishing Turkey’s current responsibility for the massacres requires
retroactive application of international law.
The fourth problem I avoid is that of identifying the eventual beneficiaries
of compensation.  There is heated debate about whether Turkey, if found
liable, should compensate the actual descendants of the survivors, the 
Republic of Armenia, which is a state, the Armenian community at large,
the Armenian diaspora, or all of the above.12  It may well be that there 
are insurmountable difficulties to implementing Turkey’s obligations, 
but again, this issue is separate from the question of Turkey’s substantive
responsibility. 
The final question I set aside is whether there is a proper jurisdiction 
somewhere that could conceivably adjudicate this dispute.  I do not
endorse the view that there is no international responsibility unless and
until a court or similar body has so adjudicated.  There is no reason to
hold that view as a matter of jurisprudence, and in practice many questions
of responsibility are decided by diplomatic negotiation.  This procedural 
issue, then, is separate from the substantive issue of responsibility that I 
address in this Article.
12. See, e.g., Henry C. Theriault, The Reparations Movement and Meaningful 




















   






    
 
II. THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
Well-established international legal rules govern the conditions under 
which a state is internationally responsible for wrongful acts.  Under the 
United Nations Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ASR), “[e]very
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility
of that State.”13  The act in question must be attributable to the state. 
The rules of attribution are complex, but the idea is that purely private 
acts do not generate the responsibility of the state unless the state somehow
condones or endorses them or is negligent in preventing them.14  When a 
state is responsible for a wrongful act, it must compensate the victim: 
“The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. Injury includes
any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally 
wrongful act . . . .”15  Finally, and crucially for my analysis here, Article
13 of the ASR establishes an intertemporal rule: “An act of a State does 
not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is 
bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”16 
The first legal question is whether the current Turkish state is a 
successor of the Ottoman Empire.  This is an easy one. The answer is
indisputably yes, and this is not denied by Turkey.  Under the well-
established rule of the continuity of the state, a new government of a 
state is internationally responsible for the breaches of international law
committed by previous governments of that same state.17  State practice 
has consistently rejected attempts to bypass this.18  Therefore, the current 
Turkish government is the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire. If the 
massacres perpetrated by the Ottoman government in 1915 constituted 
an internationally wrongful act, then present-day Turkey, as the legal
successor, is obligated to compensate the victims.  As mentioned above, 
maybe there are no plausible beneficiaries of the compensation, but 
13. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 26 (2001), available at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm [hereinafter ASR].  Most rules
contained in this document are widely seen to reflect customary law. 
14. Id. at 38. 
15. Id. at 28 (paragraph numbering omitted). 
16. Id. at 27. 
17. See T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 48–49 (7th 
ed. 1923). 
18. For example, the German government, as a successor to the Third Reich, 
continues to compensate victims of the latter’s crimes.  See, e.g., Agreement Between the 
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assuming there is a plausible beneficiary,19 Turkey has an obligation to 
compensate if the massacres constituted an international wrong in 1915.20 
III. THE POSITIVIST ANSWER: THE PROBLEM OF RETROACTIVITY 
According to some legal scholars, the international responsibility of 
present-day Turkey for the events of 1915 is problematic.21 Although
they agree that Turkey is the legal successor of the Ottoman Empire,
they deny that Turkey can be held responsible today because the events
of 1915, horrific as they were, were not wrongful acts under the
international law applicable at the time. On this view, the law of human
rights, and in particular the criminalization of massive state violence 
against civilian populations, is a creature of the post-World War II era. 
As is well known, the Holocaust and similar events prompted the
international community to add the crime of genocide and crimes against
humanity to the list of international wrongs.  Both of these wrongs are 
massive assaults against civilians; the only difference between them is 
that genocide requires the specific intent to exterminate a group. 
Conceptually then, genocide is a species of crimes against humanity. 
Genocide was, of course, established as an international wrong by the 
Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Genocide Convention.22  Crimes against
humanity arose out of a combination of the 1948 Nuremberg trials and 
19. Whether it is the Armenian state or the Armenian community. 
20. Perhaps there should be a principle of subsidiarity in cases of wrongs committed 
by a state against its own nationals.  This would mean that issues of international
responsibility would arise only if the domestic courts of the state are unable or unwilling
to hear the victim’s claims.  This is the case with regard to the Armenian massacres.  As
a general matter, the principles of state succession apply to responsibility for crimes
against humanity.  For a detailed study of the issue in relation to responsibility toward
other states, see PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
124–34 (2007).
21. The arguments that follow were offered by several international law experts
assembled at a conference in Lebanon in January 2012 convened by the Armenian Orthodox 
Church. The Author participated in that conference.  These arguments have not yet been
published.  The positivist view on nonretroactivity is shared, not surprisingly, by the Turkish
government.  See Michael Sercan Daventry, What Is the Turkish Position on the Armenian
Genocide? 31 (June 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London), 
available at www.academia.edu/237643/What_is_the_Turkish_position_on_the_Armenian_
genocide_June_2008; see also Armenian Issue Revisited, ASSEMBLY TURKISH AM. 
ASSOCIATIONS, www.ataa.org/reference/facts-ataa.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (stating 
that genocide did not exist before 1944). 
22. See Genocide Convention, supra note 10, art. 2. 
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subsequent treaties and various incarnations of state practice, culminating
with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.23 
These new international wrongs, then, were codified in international
law after 1945. The general consensus is that, with a few exceptions,
there was no meaningful law of human rights before then.  The treatment 
by a state of its subjects was a purely domestic matter with which
international law was not concerned. Repellent as that may sound to 
our modern ears, prior to 1945 governments had no formal international
legal constraints on how they treated their own citizens. 
Now, the law of state responsibility is clear.  As I indicated, “an act of
a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless 
the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”24 
Simply put, under this rule, the developments since 1945, including
the Nuremberg rulings and the Genocide Convention, cannot be applied 
retroactively.  Although the Genocide Convention does not indicate whether 
it is supposed to apply retroactively, general principles of the law of treaties 
suggest a negative answer.25  Because the massacres of 1915 concerned
exclusively the Ottoman government’s dealings with Ottoman citizens— 
the Armenians were subjects of the Ottoman Empire—international law at 
the time did not include these events, horrific as they were, among the
international wrongs for which states can be held responsible today.  This 
nonretroactivity rule, again, applies both to the Genocide Convention and to
related state practice that established the wrongfulness of crimes against 
humanity.  On this positivist account, Turkey cannot be held responsible 
today for an act that did not constitute an international wrong at the time
of commission by a previous government.
The nonretroactivity argument is independent of other considerations,
for example, the view that any legal cause of action, if there ever was
one, has run the statute of limitations—in international law language, has 
prescribed—given that almost one hundred years have passed.  The 
prescription argument is dubious in view of the nature of the crime.26 
But at any rate, the question of substantive responsibility is conceptually
23. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7. 
24. ASR, supra note 13, at 27. 
25. Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads, 
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, 
its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place 
or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that party.
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
26. Today, these crimes are considered imprescriptible. See Convention on the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73. 
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prior to the question of prescription, and I am focusing on only the former.
Under the view we are considering, Turkey is not internationally
responsible today because Turkey was not internationally responsible then, 
prescription or not. 
This view is positivist because it assumes that international law is entirely
conventional.  It is created by states—and maybe others—only by treaty
or custom.  International law is the child of diplomatic history; its rules are
determined only by pointing to specific social facts—treaties and state
practice. Because international law did not recognize violence by a state 
against its own subjects as a crime in 1915, the Ottoman Empire was not 
internationally responsible then, and consequently the state of Turkey, 
its successor, is not responsible now. 
However, a positivist approach to the issue of retroactivity need not be 
so simple.  Positivists have some resources to rebut the presumption of 
nonretroactivity.  The first one is that the international community may
decide today that a new norm will be retroactive. After all, the ASR
concedes that nothing in its text precludes or affects responsibility arising
out of a peremptory norm of international law—ius cogens.27  So if the  
international community enacts, by treaty or custom, a new peremptory 
norm that establishes the retroactivity of present norms criminalizing 
massive acts of violence against civilians, then Turkey can be held
responsible after all. In other words, nonretroactivity is a contingent
principle, one we generally favor for reasons of fairness.  It is not a
conceptual feature of legal rules.  As the prominent positivist Hans 
Kelsen said, “Nothing prevents us from applying a norm as a scheme of
interpretation, a standard of evaluation, to facts which occurred before the
moment when the norm came into existence.”28 
Of course, this requires a treaty or custom binding on Turkey that 
establishes the retroactivity of these new norms.  That norm, however,
has not been established, and it is highly unlikely that the international
community will formally enact a rule of retroactivity that would expose 
its most powerful members to scrutiny for crimes committed in the 
distant past.29  Therefore, this attempt to establish Turkey’s current 
responsibility for a past wrong is unavailable to the positivist.
27. ASR, supra note 13, at 28. 
28. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 43 (Anders Wedberg 
trans., 1961). 
29. For example, think about the United States’ history with Native Americans or
Russia’s history with Stalin’s purges. 
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A second positivist move is to argue that the prohibition of state-
conducted mass murder was an international crime in the positivist’s 
sense in 1915 after all.  This argument has two slightly different variations.
The first one suggests that the Genocide Convention has retroactive 
reach because it crystallized preexisting customary law.  The second one 
likewise claims that genocide was a crime in 1915, regardless of whether
this means that the convention applies retroactively.  On this latter 
version, we do not need to decide whether the convention can be applied
retroactively; all we need is to establish that customary law prohibited
mass murder of nationals circa 1915.
In order to do this, a positivist may point out that contemporary 
documents and communications can be interpreted as establishing the
wrongfulness of state-conducted mass murder.  If so, they cover the 
Armenian massacres.  An argument of this sort uses a loose concept of 
customary law: these documents and communications, even apart from 
prior or contemporary practice, are evidence of, or amount to, custom. 
The documents in question are communications that the Triple Entente 
addressed to the Ottoman Empire.30  They read, “[T]he Allied governments
announce publicly that they will hold all the members of the Ottoman
Government, as well as such of their agents as are implicated, personally
responsible for such matters.”31  On this view, these pronouncements are
evidence that international law circa 1915 considered these actions as 
international wrongs—as state and individual crimes.  They constitute 
opinio juris, which, coupled to subsequent developments, show that the 
law of international crimes predates 1945, contrary to what is commonly 
thought.
I find this argument unpersuasive on positivist grounds.  For, if 
conventional wisdom is correct and there was no law of human rights in 
1915, then these communications either did not intend to make a legal
point, in which case they cannot possibly be opinio juris, or if they were 
meant to make a legal point, they were simply wrong and Turkey cannot
be held responsible today by mistaken assessments of the law made by
Turkey’s enemies in 1915. It seems to me that this customary law
argument is a rather contrived attempt to recognize the obvious—that it 
was always wrong for states to mass murder their subjects—by dressing
it in positivist garments.  I think the best reading of those statements is 
that they recognized, then, that a state that committed these atrocities 
was acting contrary to international law, custom or no custom.  That is 
why I believe these pronouncements were significant, but not as evidence
30. See Armenian Genocide, UNITED HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, http://www.united
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of positivist custom.  As I will try to show, they were correct assessments of
international law understood in a nonpositivist way.
A final positivist move relies on the Nuremberg trials.  The Nuremberg 
court apparently applied the Act of London of 1945, which criminalized
the defendants’ acts, to events preceding the Act.32  The argument for 
Turkey’s responsibility would then be that Nuremberg is a valid precedent
for the retroactivity of international norms that establish massive violence 
against civilians as international wrongs. So we can now “pull a 
Nuremberg” on Turkey.  If the Nuremberg opinion is valid precedent, then
its reasoning applies to Turkey today.
But this, again, is unpersuasive on positivist grounds.  For one thing,
the Nuremberg court could have been wrong in applying the London Act 
retroactively; indeed, the court had trouble citing any precedent justifying 
retroactivity.33  But more important, the Nuremberg trials were criminal
trials. The court was able to judge the criminal intent of the defendants 
appearing before it. An important link in the court’s reasoning was that 
the defendants “had to know” that their acts were criminal.34  In contrast, 
the individuals who rule Turkey today had nothing to do with the crimes, 
and so the Nuremberg grounds for retroactivity, based as they were on
intent, cannot apply given that all relevant protagonists are long dead. 
Still, as with the previous issue, there is an important nonpositivist point 
that the Nuremberg court made: the massacres conducted by the Germans 
were crimes circa 1938, not because the Nuremberg judgments correctly
assessed custom but because the court accurately saw that a reasonable
construction of the principle of state sovereignty entailed the criminality 
of the defendants’ acts. 
As I said, these positivist moves to demonstrate the illegality of
Turkey’s behavior in 1915 are contrived ways of stating the obvious,
namely that, to any reasonable person, the Armenian massacres were crimes
in 1915. They were international law crimes that generate responsibility 
today.  This is not because a properly modified concept of custom points
to that conclusion.  The Triple Entente in 1915 and the Nuremberg court 
accurately saw that these massive acts of violence were international 
32. See Opening Statement of Robert Jackson, in  DAVID LUBAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 77, 77–81 (2010). 
33. For a contemporary criticism of the trials, see Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 
Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1946, at 66. 




   
 


















wrongs, but what they saw was not custom or treaty.  Their judgment 
about the illegality of those acts was not grounded on any concrete legal 
materials or state practice.  The pedigree of the norm that prohibits state-
conducted mass murder is not a positivist pedigree, where positivist
pedigree denotes the property of having been created by treaty or custom.
IV. NATURAL LAW AS PART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Instead, the international wrong of state-conducted mass murder is 
grounded in a simple analysis of the core concept of international law.
In order to make my case, I will use two different though compatible 
arguments.  First, the view that states in 1915 were legally permitted 
to massively assault their subjects is incompatible with the concept of a
state as it was understood in 1915.  Second, the view that states in 1915
were permitted to perpetrate such actions does not meet what I call the
“test of the impartial observer.”  What I mean is that the wrongfulness of
state-conducted mass murder would have been apparent to any impartial 
observer called upon to pass on that issue in 1915.  Take those in turn. 
A. Mass Murder and the Concept of the State 
Since its inception, international law was meant to regulate the interaction 
between independent communities.  We all know that international law 
today has broader coverage, but at the very least, international law is
supposed to lay the rules of conduct among communities organized as 
sovereign states.  This original function endures today but was even more 
important during the past few centuries when international law evolved. 
Central to this idea is, of course, the concept of a state.  What is a state?
Minimally, a state is a population living in a territory ruled by a
government.35 The power exercised by the government should be effective
because effectiveness is a precondition for maintaining a reasonable 
relationship with other states.  If states are incapable of maintaining
internal order, then international law cannot regulate interstate relations
effectively.
But this law and order function is, on closer analysis, a protective 
function.36  The government must rule effectively in order to protect us 
35. Thus, Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States reads, “The state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”  Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 
165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
36. By using the term protective, I do not mean to buy wholesale the modern 
responsibility to protect concept, although it overlaps some with what I say in the text. 
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from one another and from external enemies, as Hobbes and Locke argued. 
It must have the power to fulfill this dual protective role.  This is a 
minimalist concept of the state, an idea, I hope, that will be shared by
almost everyone regardless of differences in opinion about what other
legitimate tasks states may perform.37 
If this is correct, then the claim that the state is permitted to commit 
mass murder against its own subjects contradicts the concept of the state.
International law assumes that states will minimally protect their citizens. 
This elementary normative concept does not require democracy, not 
even respect for human rights as we understand them today.  It merely
excludes state-conducted mass murder because such behavior is inconsistent 
with the assumption that underlies international law: governments will
take care of their subjects.  That does not mean that international law thus
conceived required states in 1915 to respect their subjects’ liberties or
possessions, much as we would require that today. I do not even assume
that this crude concept of international law prohibited states from killing
some subjects if they thought it was required in some way to fulfill their 
protective function, although if pressed I would not concede this.  I have
to assume only that, whatever else governments may do, they are at least
required not to massively murder their subjects. 
It might help to compare this argument with the method followed by
St. Thomas Aquinas.  Aquinas famously defined law as “a rational ordering
of things which concern the common good; promulgated by whoever is 
charged with the care of the community.”38  Critics have considered this
definition inadequate because it excludes iniquitous legal systems, given 
that these, by definition, have not been promulgated for the common good.
I think this is an uncharitable reading of Aquinas.  His point is not that 
all laws are in fact enacted for the common good. Rather, his point is
that laws are supposed to be for the common good.  They are supposed
to have a public purpose.  Aquinas makes the important point that the 
concept of law contains an evaluative element. The law is supposed to
be for the benefit of the subjects, for the common good.  This is a true
element of law, whether we conceive the idea of common good as 
deontological, utilitarian, virtue based, or some combination.  Perhaps, 
37. Other tasks could include realizing equality, promoting prosperity, supplying
public goods, and so forth.
38. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. 90, art. 4, as reprinted in M.D.A.





   




   
   
    
  








   
    




    
 





as Kant thought, good laws are those that would receive the assent of all 
rational persons, even those whom the law harms.39  If my taxes go up to
alleviate poverty, they are rationally justified to me, even if I have to pay
more than I would like. If my taxes go up instead to enrich the
government’s friends who help it win elections, then they are unjustified.
Now laws that actually do not pursue the common good are “corruptions 
of law.”  They are imperfect, but that does not mean that we do not owe 
them allegiance all things considered.40  Maybe I have to put up with 
unjust taxes because all things considered the legal system is generally
just, or it causes more harm than good, or my disobedience would make 
things worse. 
Just as the idea that laws are supposed to be for the common good is a 
conceptual truth about the law, the idea that states are supposed to
protect their subjects is a conceptual truth about the state. Massive
violations of this protective purpose do not disqualify the state as such— 
they are “corruptions” of the state—but they are internationally wrongful. 
The sense in which state-conducted mass murder is a violation of
international law, even if we can point to no treaty or custom saying 
so, is that international law is anchored in a given conception of the state.
This conception is not purely descriptive: it carries with it normative
implications.  One of those implications is that states are supposed to 
minimally protect their subjects.  States that massively murder their subjects
betray their raison d’être. This violation is an international wrong, then, 
because the protective function is implicit in the concept of the state,
which in turn is the central concept upon which international law rests. 
Notice two claims I do not make.  First, I do not claim that Turkey
ceased being a state because of this massive violation of its protective
role. Indeed, world powers continued to deal with Turkey as a state.
I merely claim that the Armenian mass murders constituted an international
wrong in 1915 regardless of the fact that the treaty or custom did not
specifically codify the crime.  Second, and more important, I do not make 
the argument that the mass murders were so horrific that they were
unlawful, perhaps on the assumption that acts that shock the moral
conscience are necessarily illegal.  Such an argument requires a more
robust conception of natural law than the one I defend here.  Under a 
more robust conception, there is a list of natural law crimes—crimes
defined by a correct theory of morality that is simultaneously part and
39. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 25–26 (Mary Gregor ed. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: 
KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 182–231 (2009). 
40. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, Philosophical Anarchism, in  JUSTIFICATION AND 
LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 102, 109 (2001). 
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parcel of international law.  I think this robust view is eminently defensible, 
but I do not attempt that defense here.41 In this Article I make the much
more modest claim that mass murder contradicts the protective function 
embodied in the concept of the state as it stands now and as it stood in 1915.
My argument does not deny either that international law is importantly
conventional.  I concede that the concept of the state is conventional but 
claim that the prohibition of mass murder follows from this conventional
concept. The positivist, in contrast, bars these inferences.  To him, for
state-conducted mass murder to be an international wrong, the international 
community has to create a separate rule that prohibits that act.  So to the
positivist, the concept of the state is conventional but has no further
normative implications.  I find this view of law impoverished. Think
about the concept of a parent, for example.42  We would say that being a
parent naturally entails some responsibilities, that, as Dworkin would 
say, there is a principle embodied in the idea of parent that is as much
part of the legal concept as the descriptive dimension of the concept.43 
One could say, then, that an intelligent interpretation of the word state
acknowledges that states exist for some purpose and that this act, the act
of genocide, is incompatible with that purpose.  This kind of reasoning
does not require us to depart from conventional rules, nor does it force 
us to deny that law is importantly conventional.  For one thing, even if
natural law norms exist, we need convention to make those rules
determinate and define their boundaries with reasonable precision. 
Perhaps natural law says that the resources of the sea should be fairly 
shared by all states, but we need the Law of the Sea Convention to work 
out the details.44 Perhaps natural law says that treaties must be honored,
but we need the Vienna Convention to specify how and under what 
circumstances treaties are made and terminated.45 The prohibition of
state-conducted mass murder is quite determinate, but even here we need
the laws of war, or the emergency clauses in human rights treaties, to
specify when and how the state may permissibly kill people. 
41. See generally  FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1998) (arguing that international law should be interpreted as incorporating philosophical
insights).
42. I thank Jim Nickel for the example. 
43. See Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157, 158 (2004). 
44. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 25. 
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My point is that the mass-murder prohibition is natural in a way that 
does not deny, but rather supplements, the conventionality of international
law.  This position is not vulnerable to the charge that should it be allowed,
then anything goes and international law would be an amorphous tool in
the hands of philosophers.  Law is, and remains, importantly conventional.
The concept of the state itself is a conventional concept—after all, for a 
long time, there were no states. However, the fact that the concept
is conventional does not prevent disaggregating its semantic layers.  To
assert “this is a state” implies that we should have an answer to the question 
“and what are states for?”  At the very least, I suggest, states are for 
protection. And this protective function excludes, again, at the very
least, the permission of exterminating their subjects. 
For those who recoil at the idea of invoking the unfashionable authority
of Aquinas, my argument can be reformulated in modern language.  Simply
put, in order to determine the content of international law, we must
necessarily use not just descriptive facts but values as well.46  Trying to
determine how exactly social facts determine the content of the law
requires giving reasons. The determination of legal content is thus not 
exhausted by the facts in question because those facts do not provide 
sufficient information to make that determination.  Instead, we determine 
legal content by reasoning about the practices—treaty and custom.  We
engage in rational determination: “Value facts are needed to determine 
the legal relevance of different aspects of law practices.”47  This, I contend, 
is a necessary truth.  A difference between positivists and antipositivists 
about the content of the law is therefore not a debate about the nature of 
law; instead, it is a contest between the different reasons that each side
gives to make the legal determination from facts to legal content.  When 
positivists say that states in 1915 were legally allowed to massacre their
subjects, they are not making a value-neutral legal determination.  Their 
view is supported by values that differ from the values of those who
claim that states in 1915 were not allowed to massacre their subjects.48 
46. I follow here Greenberg, supra note 43, at 158. 
47. Id. at 160. 
48. Here is Greenberg’s account of the argument:
It is, I claim, a general truth that a domain of descriptive facts can rationally
determine facts in a dependent, higher-level domain only in combination with 
truths about which aspects of the descriptive, lower-level facts are relevant to 
the higher-level domain and what their relevance is.  Without the standards 
provided by such truths, it is indeterminate which candidate facts in the higher-
level domain are most supported by the lower-level facts.  There is a further 
question about the source or nature of the needed truths (about the relevance of 
the descriptive facts to the higher-level domain).  In the legal case, these truths
are, I will suggest, truths about value. 
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The concept of the state is best understood as containing a prohibition of
mass murder of its subjects.  It is a concept of the state supported by the 
better reasons in the determination of legal content—in this case, a
determination of the legal responsibility of present-day Turkey for the 
events of 1915.
B. The Impartial Observer Test
Suppose an unbiased observer would have been asked in 1915 the 
following question: “Is it lawful for a state to murder 1.5 million of its 
subjects?” The answer, almost surely, would have been a resounding 
“no.” But why?  Because in 1915 it was self-evident that states could not 
permissibly do that.  Here we can see the significance of the communications 
by the Triple Entente.  The actions by the Ottoman Empire were simply
unacceptable, shocking, to any normal observer.  It is true that these nations
were Turkey’s enemies, but nonetheless, the position by the Entente was 
against interest because the implication is that these nations, too, were
precluded from massively murdering their subjects.  It is significant that 
they did not have any qualms in warning the Ottoman rulers that they
would be held accountable for their behavior.  Their language was couched
in law, not in morality.  Surely it would have been a respectable legal
argument for condemning the Soviet purges in the 1930s and 1940s to 
cite, estoppel-like, to the 1915 Triple Entente’s communication on the
Armenian massacres.  The best interpretation of these facts, then, is that
these governments saw that these massacres were not within the legal
discretion of the Ottoman Empire.  It did not occur to them or to anyone 
at the time to make the argument that present-day positivists make: Turkey
was legally allowed to massacre its subjects.
It is important to carefully confine the reach of the impartial observer 
test. It is not a conclusive test, and it is parasitic on my first conceptual
point. Suppose the issue is whether slavery is illegal. I think our impartial 
observer would have said so in the United States in the 1800s.  But I am
not sure if an impartial observer would have said the same thing in
ancient Greece.  Whatever our views on moral objectivity and the moral
fabric of the universe, the impartial observer test is context dependent.  It 
imagines someone who is unbiased in the context of the time and place 
in which the person is observing events.  For example, the impartial
observer in 1915 would not have said that states are permitted to
massacre their subjects but would have perhaps agreed that governments














    
      






impartial observer’s dictum about massacres in 1915 to universal truths
about massacres or any other legal or moral practices, in that time or in 
any other time.  Nor do I offer any independent foundation for the impartial 
observer test except stating it in an intuitive way as a confirmation of the 
conceptual point about the intrinsic protective role of the state.  I do not 
believe that the impartial observer would have said things such as, 
“Sure, Turkey would be morally wrong to murder its subjects, but it is
legally permitted to do so.”  One who makes this distinction, I contend,
has the burden of proof, not the other way around.
C. The Objection from Arbitrariness 
One could object that these evaluative considerations built into the 
definition of international law inevitably lead to arbitrariness. The idea 
is that, for good or ill, natural law analysis is a thing of the past and the 
international community has settled on different law-creating methods. 
Broadly speaking, these are custom and treaty.  Anything else opens the
door to arbitrary preferences parading as law.
I have three replies.  The first I already gave: the positivist’s legal
determination also uses values.  Legal content cannot, as a conceptual
matter, be determined solely by appealing to social facts.  Second and
related, the method I propose is more transparent than the practice in
which many international lawyers indulge.  Much of what passes as 
“custom” in international law circles is in reality the expression of a 
value held by the advocate or court, a value that has not ostensibly been 
codified by any positivist source but that the speaker promotes in positivist
disguise.  I can give plenty of examples. Courts routinely apply rules based
on “general practice” without pointing out where that practice comes from.
International human rights advocates routinely argue that “such and
such” norm is custom by citing all kinds of nonauthoritative sources. 
I call this practice “fake custom.”  Practitioners of fake custom resort to
a number of techniques.  Their arguments are really evaluative arguments,
yet appear to be positivist arguments because they cite various kinds of 
concrete sources. Some favorite sources of fake custom are nonbinding 
resolutions, speeches, memoranda, and the like that contain the rule in 
question. Another favorite positivist technique is to cite adoption of the 
norm in question by any number of domestic legislations.  The 
precautionary principle in environmental law is an example of this. 
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states as evidence that it is a rule of customary law.49 This would mean, 
of course, that those states can legislate for the entire world. 
Advocates and courts want to maintain the positivist illusion—the 
illusion that the norms they favor come from positivist sources, that they
are not therefore arbitrary pieces of advocacy. But this is a mirage
prompted by the desire to avoid the charge of arbitrariness—the charge 
that one is making up international rules out of thin air.  This contrived 
positivist stance is glaring in the case of bad customary law arguments,
but it is also common in treaty interpretation.  I do not pursue this large 
issue here, but I agree with Dworkin’s interpretivist views.50  Treaties 
and practices have to be interpreted in the light of the moral and
political principles that plausibly underlie those practices. A good 
interpretation is one that puts those practices in the best possible light. 
My natural law approach, then, does not try to conceal the fact that
propositions of law are necessarily normative in that broader sense.  It
does not pretend to find the wrongfulness of mass murder in some 
nonexisting state practice.  It simply points out that the best interpretation
of the concept of statehood circa 1915 includes a prohibition of mass
murder, document or no document, practice or no practice.  My natural
law approach recognizes from the outset that some norms are part of the 
law even if they fail the positivist pedigree test. Thus, for example, a 
good argument for the precautionary principle would be a substantive 
argument showing why the principle is rationally required, if it is required,
to avoid environmental collapse.  That argument would openly
acknowledge that evaluative considerations of various kinds, including
considerations of efficiency, are part and parcel of legal reasoning.  It 
would not try to reformulate those evaluative considerations in the 
positivist language of custom.
My third reply insists on the modest reach of my argument.  Unlike
Grotius and Vitoria, I do not claim that natural law provides an answer 
to all questions of international law.51  It does not answer matters of detail 
49. See, e.g., James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 
14 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991). 
50. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986). 
51. See generally FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in VITORIA: 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 293 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (addressing
in detail numerous areas of international law as mandated by reason); 1 HUGO GROTIUS, 






   
 
   











such as the breadth of the territorial sea, the precise detail of the laws of
war, or whether compensation for wrongs should make the victim whole.  
I am even agnostic in this Article, as I said, about what human rights
governments must observe or what political regimes are or are not
legitimate.52  My claim is quite basic: a legal permission for states to 
massively murder their own citizens is inconsistent with the concept of 
the state and therefore with the concept of international law because it
rests in turn on the idea of a state.  This was true in 1915, and it is true 
today.  The impartial observer procedure I suggested tests this conceptual 
truth.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of Turkish responsibility for the Armenian massacres 
illustrates a larger jurisprudential point.  The information needed to make
substantive legal judgments is not and cannot be exhaustively contained 
in a purely descriptive account of the sources of international law.
Faced with this type of problem, one can proceed in three ways.  One is 
to insist that the norms of international law are those established by
diplomatic history—custom and treaty.  If those processes did not yield 
the norm in question in 1915, then the norm did not exist—it was not a 
valid norm—in 1915.  This is the standard positivist position described
above. A second strategy is to attempt to squeeze the desired norm, say, 
the prohibition of mass murder, out of positivist sources.  One could say, 
for example, that the state is a historical construct established by practice. 
After all, there was a time when there were no states.  And, as a matter 
of custom, the norm existed in 1915 as part of the rule that defines states. 
As I indicated, I think this position is contrived because it stubbornly
clings to the view that legal propositions are exhaustively contained in 
positivist sources. Finally, the third position, the one I favor, is to
openly acknowledge that at least some of the information that we need to
formulate legal norms is not traceable to positivist sources but found 
instead in evaluative considerations, in intelligent practical reasoning. 
52. Loren Lomasky and I address the question of state legitimacy in our book 
Justice at a Distance: A Classical-Liberal Approach to Global Justice (forthcoming 2014). 
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